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I
INTRODUCTION
The control of crime has been a predominantly local responsibility
through the history of the Republic. Similarly, the regulation of morality
generally has been viewed as a local responsibility, with each community
enjoying the freedom to choose its own moral legislation. The last decade,
however, has witnessed the rapid growth of a federal police effort aimed
primarily at enforcing drug regulations. Drug enforcement has become a
major federal responsibility, though drug policy is treated as the regulation of
vice markets. This federal intervention is justified on the basis of paternalistic
concerns about the effects of the behavior on both the user and society
generally.
For example, the federal drug enforcement effort currently involves
expenditures of approximately $2 billion' and provides a significant presence
in cities throughout the nation. Although state and local authorities continue
to make a majority of the arrests for violation of drug laws, 2 prisoners who
were arrested by federal agencies account for a substantial minority of the
total number of years spent in incarceration for drug violations. 3 Moreover,
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1. The Office of Management and Budget estimated total federal drug enforcement
expenditures at over $2.5 billion in fiscal year 1987. NATIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY BOARD,
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY 187 (1987) (ASI 87:6004-19).
2. State and local agencies arrested an estimated 824,100 persons on drug charges in 1986.
Thirty-six percent of those state and local arrests were for simple possession of marijuana. FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE U.S.-1986. at 163-64 (1987).
Federal agencies do not keep consolidated arrest figures, so a comparable total cannot be provided.
However, the Drug Enforcement Administration recorded a total of 15,695 arrests in fiscal year
1985, some of which were originally made by other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT OF
FY1985, at 7 (1985).
3. In fiscal year 1984, the most current year for which one can find comparable data, federal
institutions admitted 4,844 inmates on drug charges. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1985, at 545 (1986). The average sentence for these individuals was 61
months, accounting for approximately 24,600 "bed-years" of prison capacity. The Bureau ofJustice
estimated that there were 13,000 convicted inmates in local jails around the country in 1983. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1986, at 396 (1987). Those
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in a local jail serve sentences of less than 12 months. A
generous estimate would be an average sentence of six months, accounting for 6,500 bed-years. For
the same year, one can estimate 14,000 admissions to state institutions (not including local jails) on
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in many instances when local forces are involved in drug enforcement, they
work largely under the direction of federal agents. 4
Drugs have become, by a number of criteria, the dominant concern of
federal law enforcement. For example, of those criminals receiving prison
sentences in federal courts during the year July 1, 1985, through June 30,
1986, 40 percent were convicted of drug violations. 5 Similarly, the growth in
the federal prison population since 1980 is due largely to increasing
incarcerations of drug dealers.6 In short, the federal government has become
the engine for a massive expansion of the entire national drug enforcement
effort.
The rationale for federal intervention is clear, though not clearly
articulated. Drug distribution is a national and international business. State
and local agencies lack both the legal authority and the investigative resources
to deal with an enterprise of this magnitude. The federal government must,
therefore, bear responsibility for some elements of drug enforcement,
particularly where international diplomacy, high-seas patrol, or multi-state
investigation is required.
It is undisputed that the federal government currently bears ultimate
responsibility for some aspects of the control of trade in drugs. Its acceptance
of this responsibility, however, raises two questions. First, does such a
responsibility justify the allocation of significant resources to federal
enforcement activities? Second, is this level of federal intrusion into an area
of traditional state concern appropriate? This article investigates what must
be the first step toward answering these questions, namely, how one can
measure the effectiveness of drug enforcement at any government level.
Much emphasis has been placed on the quantity of drugs seized, and
federal officials have clearly seized large quantities of drugs. Little attention is
paid, however, to the point in the distribution chain at which the product is
seized. Drugs are easy to produce but difficult to distribute. The federal
government is uniquely well-positioned to combat the drug trade at
importation, the beginning of the distribution process. The replacement cost
of drugs seized at the border, however, is small in comparison to the
drug charges. (This figure is based on 167,000 total admissions, of which 8.3% are for drug
charges.) Id. at 402, 409. These individuals served an average sentence of 56 months, accounting
for 65,000 bed-years.
4. The Drug Enforcement Administration recorded 3,172 arrests made by the state and local
task forces with which it worked in 1985. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. JUSTICE DEP'T
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FY1985, supra note 2, at 29.
5. Of the 20,621 individuals receiving prison sentences from U.S. District Courts in the year
ending June 30, 1986, 8,152 (40%) were for drug convictions. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 1986, at 261-65 (1986).
6. The U.S. Sentencing Commission and the United States Marshals Service estimate that a
large percentage of the growth in the federal prison population has been the result of increased drug
enforcement. In 1981, the federal prison population was 26,000; in 1986, it was 44,000. In 1980,
25% of all commitments to federal institutions were for violation of drug laws. In 1986, 37% of all
new commitments were for drug trafficking. Kerr, War on Drugs Puts Strains on Prisons, U.S. Officials
Say, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
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replacement cost of drugs seized at some point closer to the consumer. The
use of unweighted seizure quantities as the measure of drug enforcement
effectiveness, therefore, overstates the impact of federal agencies. This article
suggests that a more appropriate measure of drug enforcement effectiveness
is the cost of replacing the seized drugs.
To illustrate this point, this article examines the largest single component
of the federal drug enforcement effort, the interdiction program, the object of
which is to seize drugs and couriers en route from source countries to the
United States. In particular, this article examines how the interdiction
program affects cocaine use in the United States. An explicit framework is
presented to analyze the impact of enforcement programs on drug use, from
which a measure of effectiveness very different from that ordinarily used in
discussions of drug enforcement is derived.
The first section of this article presents the analytical framework in which
the argument for using price levels as a measure of the effectiveness of drug
enforcement is developed. The second section then presents some data on
the scale and effect of the drug interdiction program. The third section
employs a recently developed simulation model to illustrate how increased
interdiction would have only a slight impact on the total domestic
consumption of cocaine.
II
THE ROLE OF PRICES
Drugs are sold in market transactions. Although some marijuana is
produced at home for personal use, such production accounts for a small
fraction of the total consumed. 7 Where there are markets, there are prices,
and a great deal can be learned about the functioning of these markets by
examining the prices at which the drugs are sold.8
7. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), a federal interagency
committee, estimates that 18% of the marijuana supplied in the United States in 1986 was
domestically produced. NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMMITTEE, THE NNICC
REPORT: THE SUPPLY OF ILLICIT DRUGS TO THE U.S. FROM FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC SOURCES 1985-
1986, at 15-16 (1987) [hereinafter NNICC REPORT]. Much of that domestic production appears to
have been sold commercially. See generally R. WARNER, INVISIBLE HAND: THE MARIUANA BUSINESS 28-
44, 183-208 (1986).
8. Although this proposition seems obvious, it has not been given much attention in the debate
over drug policy. Consider, for example, the numerous hearings held by the House Government
Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee (Committee on Government Operations), in
which the chairman has vigorously attacked the performance of the federal drug enforcement
agencies. In this author's experience, neither the committee nor the agencies have ever discussed
the use of price, certainly not of a price tied to a particular level of the market, as a relevant indicator
of enforcement efficacy. The same may be said for the General Accounting Office in its numerous
reports on the federal drug program. U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts
Need Strong Central Oversight, Report GAO/GGD-83-52 (U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington,
D.C. 1983).
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Prices, even in most illegal markets, are established in voluntary
transactions.9 Sellers seek high prices, while buyers want low prices. The
price at which a transaction actually occurs is affected by perceptions of what
could be obtained in transactions with other buyers/sellers. In an
environment in which enforcement agencies use both "sell-bust" and "buy-
bust" techniques, 10 each party has a preference for minimizing his search
time, in particular by reducing the number of parties to whom he has to
disclose his participation in the market. Consequently, a buyer may be willing
to pay more than his estimate of the prevailing prices and, symmetrically, the
seller has an incentive to accept a lower-than-market price. The area of
negotiation is, therefore, likely to be larger than in comparable legal markets,
in which the risks of search are lower and price information is more freely
disseminated. Nonetheless, it is plausible that, as in markets for legal goods
and services, each bargain is not struck anew but is heavily influenced by
perceptions of market prices.
Data collected by enforcement agencies reveal patterns consistent with the
performance of a market," and even before any adjustments are made for
differences in quantity and location of transaction, it is striking just how
narrow is the range of reported prices. For example, in the fourth quarter of
1985, the highest price reported for a kilogram of cocaine' 2 was $37,000 and
the lowest price $25,000.'3 While this may appear to be a large range in
9. There may be illegal markets in which sellers can coerce buyers to transact with them. The
interpretation of price in such markets is different from that given here. See generally P. REUTER,
DISORGANIZED CRIME: THE ECONOMICS OF THE VISIBLE HAND 109-31 (1983) (an analysis of the
distinctive features of illegal markets).
10. "Buy-bust" is the traditional technique used by drug enforcement agents, in which they pose
as buyers of drugs and then arrest sellers. Agencies now also use "sell-bust" methods, in which
agents pose as sellers and arrest persons seeking to buy.
11. See Lisowski, Appendix B: Analysis of Wholesale Cocaine Price Data, in P. REUTER, G. CRAWFORD &
J. CAVE, SEALING THE BORDERS: EFFECTS OF INCREASED MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN DRUG
INTERDICTION 142, 142-48 (1988). While some uncertainty may remain as to whether data gathered
by an enforcement agency in the course of its investigations represent prices in actual transactions,
three reasons exist for accepting these data as representative of markets. First, a number of them are
observations of consummated transactions, presumably often involving informants. Assuming
accurate recording, these are genuine market transactions. Second, there is very little difference
between the "buy" data and the "negotiate" data, that is, those instances in which no actual
transaction occurred. This is explained by the third reason: agents must bargain hard in
negotiations in order to establish their bonafides. The undercover agent/seller does not want to seem
overly eager to engage the buyer in a transaction by offering too low a price. At the same time,
however, he wants to transact, so he will try not to set the price too high. Indeed, the very reason
given by the Office of Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration for maintaining the data
base was to provide agents with accurate price information when entering into undercover
transactions.
12. The analysis was restricted to cocaine price data because the slight volume of data regarding
marijuana in specific quarters, regions, and sizes could not support detailed analysis. The price
range within the very disparate set of transactions recorded by the Drug Enforcement Administration
was still fairly modest, however. According to statistics provided by the DEA's Office of Intelligence,
for the first quarter of 1985 the interquartile range was $150, compared to a median price of $375
per pound. (The "interquartile range" is the range between the top 25% of the observations and the
bottom 25%-thus, by definition containing one-half of the observations).
13. Discussions with officials of the Office of Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement
Administration [hereinafter Discussions with DEA officals].
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price, it appears more modest when compared to the range of prices over a
one-quarter period in other consumer markets.' 4
When account is taken of geographic variation, these data suggest that one
can indeed talk about "the price" of a kilogram of cocaine, at least in the
major markets. If one were to divide the nation into three regions (Florida,
metropolitan New York, and the rest of the nation), one would a priori expect
the price of cocaine to differ among these three markets. Florida, as the entry
point of large quantities of cocaine, should show the lowest price, while New
York, as the largest retail market, should show lower prices than should the
rest of the nation. As expected, the median price reported for Florida (the
state with by far the largest number of observations) is significantly lower than
that reported for the rest of the nation, while the New York median falls
between them for every quarter.' 5
Moreover, the range of prices is more limited within each region than in
the total data set. The interquartile range for Florida is only $7,000 for the
second quarter of 1986, compared to a median price of $28,000.16 In the
same quarter, the interquartile range is $10,000 for all the observations
outside of Florida and metropolitan New York, compared to a median price of
$36,000.' 7 Given that the different regions outside of Florida may constitute
different markets, and are on the average farther from the point of
importation, one would expect both a higher median and more variation, as
was in fact found.
Further, reported prices are lower in large transactions than in small
transactions.' 8 This is consistent with the hypothesis that the data are
samples from different levels of a market and that larger lots sell at lower unit
prices because fewer risks have yet been incurred. The median price for the
third quarter of 1986 in sales of ten to 100 kilograms was $27,000, compared
to $34,500 in sales of between one and ten kilograms. 19 Since most
importation attempts involve more than ten kilograms, 20 and import prices
14. These results are somewhat comparable to the res'ults of price differential studies in retail
consumer markets. See, e.g., Pratt, Wise & Zeckhauser, Price Differences in Almost Competitive Markets, 93
Q J. EcoN. 189, 189-207 (1979). Pratt's summary statistics, including the mean and standard
deviation, describe prices for 39 products obtained from between four and 22 firms. The 39
coefficients of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) derived from these data
range from 0.04 to 0.71, with three quarters of them below 0.30. For the cocaine price data, dividing
the sample median by 1.35 times the sample interquartile range yields a robust equivalent of the
coefficient of variation. For the seven quarters of our aggregate data, these estimates range from
0.16 to 0.54. They are generaly larger than those derived from the Pratt study. Those authors,
however, chose uniform products in a limited geographical market, while our data represent a variety
of drug purities, transaction locations, and dates.
15. For the fourth quarter of 1985, the reported median prices per kilogram of cocaine were:
Florida, $34,000; New York, $38,000; rest of the nation, $40,000. See Lisowski, supra note 11, at 146.
16. With a median wholesale price of $28,000 per kilogram, and an interquartile range of
$7,000, half of the prices negotiated were higher than $21,000 and lower than $35,000. Id. at 146-
47.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. For fiscal year 1985, the DEA analyzed data on 2.3 metric tons of seized cocaine. Of those
2.3 tons, 2.0 (87%) were seized in shipments of more than 100 kilograms. An additional 0.23 tons
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are estimated by reference to the average price from all transactions greater
than one kilogram, the effectiveness of interdiction efforts is exaggerated by
the use of this price measure. 2'
These analyses support the contention that price is a meaningful term in
the analysis of drug market behavior. Attention is now turned to the
consideration of how enforcement, particularly interdiction, affects prices at
different points in the distribution system. What follows is iargely a statement
of the economist's creed, 22 applied to a setting somewhat different from that
to which the creed is usually applied. Reliance on the creed is necessary
because the measurement of illegal market phenomena is so weak; 23 such
reliance is also appropriate since the creed has demonstrated its power in
such a wide range of settings.
The following analysis assumes that the price of drugs is determined by
supply and demand conditions, albeit with acknowledgement that, as the
above-described price data reflect, there are some impediments to the flow of
market information. The analysis also assumes that demand is unaffected by
enforcement, since the variations in import-level enforcement under
consideration are so distant from the user. It is the supply side that receives
attention, since that is what links federal enforcement efforts to consumption.
The supply curve for illicit drugs (that is, the relationship between price
and the quantity of product that dealers will be willing to offer) is determined
largely by perceptions of risk. 24 Except at the retail end (with which the
federal agencies are explicitly not concerned), there are no other significant
inputs (although actual selling time may be a nontrivial component of costs, at
least for the marijuana retailer). Dealers will be willing to incur the various
risks attendant on participation in the trade (incarceration, loss of assets,
physical injury by other participants) in return for an appropriate level of
earnings. If those risks increase, some participants can be expected to drop
out unless the expected earnings rise correspondingly. This increase in
(10%) were seized in shipments of 10 to 100 kilograms. Initiatives in Drug Interdiction (Part 1): Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture of the House Committee on Government
Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 608 (1985) (data submitted by D. Lowell Jensen, Deputy Attorney
General) [hereinafter Jensen Testimony].
21. According to the Office of Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration, in
calculating the average price for cocaine transactions, law enforcement officials will take the total
price paid (or negotiated) and divide by the number of kilograms involved. These prices are then
summed for a time period and divided by the number of transactions which take place. The result is
an upward bias since a 100 kilogram transaction is given the same weight as a one kilogram
transaction.
22. The economist's creed is that, as the price of a good increases, and other factors
(consumers' incomes, prices of other goods, etc.) remain constant, consumers will generally choose
to consume less of the good, or cease consuming the good altogether. The exceptions are arcane.
See W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONoMIc THEORY 102-03 (2d ed. 1978).
23. For example, this author has seen no study actually demonstrating that increased
enforcement against an illegal market shifts the supply curve.
24. For instance, raising enforcement levels increases one set of component risks, in that the
dealer is more likely to be deprived of freedom or some assets by enforcement authorities. Whether
it affects risks of other participants is unclear. See generally Reuter & Kleiman, Risks and Prices: An
Economic Analysis of Drug Enforcement, in 7 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 289,
302 (M. Tonry & N. Morris eds. 1986).
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earnings is realized through higher prices, which in turn decreases
consumption. 25
With this economist's creed in mind, it is now necessary to turn to an
examination of the lengthy system of drug distribution. Cocaine is often
imported in 200 kilogram lots, frequently to be sold in units of 250 pure
milligrams. 26 It is likely that there are as many as six links in that distribution
system, even if each seller is willing to deal with as many as ten customers.
(Very high level dealers may be unwilling to deal with even that number.)
Each level can be thought of as a market, since a different set of participants
will be involved; dealers seeking to sell ten-kilogram units of cocaine will not
transact with sellers who wish to buy only one-ounce units. Different
enforcement programs strike primarily at different markets, though there are
important linkages connecting the markets. 27
The interdiction program, with a few minor exceptions, affects the market
at the import level. It raises the cost of smuggling drugs from the source
countries. The cost increases arise from the need: (a) to ship more of the
drug per kilogram delivered to the United States; (b) to spend more in legal
fees and in replacing seized equipment; and, most importantly, (c) to pay
more personnel for incurring the higher risks of arrest and incarceration.
These cost increases tend to raise the prices charged by smugglers to those
who buy the drug at the first transaction in the United States ("importers").
The import or "landed" price is raised, which affects the price in transactions
further along the distribution chain, primarily because importers must now
charge more for the drugs in order to maintain their own income.
Interdiction affects drug use primarily through this price increase. There
are two other inferable effects, and this article asserts (and it is no more than
an assertion) that they are no more than second order effects. These include
(1) the symbolic deterrent effect of reports of large seizures, providing
continued evidence of the government's effective disapproval of sale and
purchase; and (2) encouraging source country governments to increase their
efforts at reducing production and export. Those who believe the first of
these effects to be important have a peculiar faith in symbolic deterrence. As
25. Note that, as in all market analyses, not all participants are assumed to make rational
calculations at the margin; only some need to do so in order for the anticipated result to obtain.
26. Of the cocaine seized in 100 kilogram-or-greater shipments (which accounted for 87% of the
cocaine seized in fiscal year 1985), seeJensen Testimony, supra note 20, at 608, the average shipment
size was actually 340 kilograms. The 250 milligrams figure is based on several interviews, including
discussions with narcotics officers with the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department.
While purity and retail quantities can fluctuate, this estimate is accurate enough for the purpose of
discussion.
27. For example, control programs in the source countries will affect the export price of drugs,
since these programs raise the risks incurred by growers, refiners, and source country distributors.
These programs will affect drug distribution downstream only to the extent that the export price is
raised and the supply from the source countries becomes less reliable.
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to the latter, recent analyses have pointed to the ineffectiveness of source
country programs, even if the source countries are willing to support them.28
Nevertheless, many find it difficult to accept the notion that the entire
impact of an enforcement program, even one as divorced from the user as
interdiction, can be captured in price. A number of seminar audiences have
been unconvinced of the correctness of this position. Most officials, and even
some academics, remain convinced that there is some other similarly
important effect which is not captured by price. In particular, the notion that
the seizure of drugs will simply lead to their replacement, albeit at a somewhat
higher cost, can seem implausible. Yet this doubt can be eliminated by
considering the other possible effects of interdiction. There appear to be only
three: 29
(1) The quantity of drugs entering this country might be physically limited to a
certain amount. Consumption would be limited to this amount and price
would adjust correspondingly. This result is implausible because too much
cocaine is cheaply available in the source countries and too large an
experienced smuggling capacity exists for the replacement of seized drugs to
be a limiting factor. For example, the official estimates of total consumption
in the United States consistently report significant excess supply in the
marijuana and cocaine markets. 30 U.S. consumption may account for no more
than one third of total marketable production of these drugs.3' Although
there is repeated reference to a small cartel (the "Medellin" cartel)
controlling the export of cocaine from Colombia to the United States, there is
also evidence that there are many other competent and experienced
smugglers.3 2
28. See generally Nadelmann, International Drug Trafficking and U.S. Foreign Policy, THE WASH. Q,
Fall 1985, at 87, 91-94; Reuter, Eternal Hope: America's Questfor Narcotics Control, THE PUB. INTEREST,
Spring 1985, at 79, 85-93.
29. There is a backward link from interdiction to export prices, which in turn affect import
prices. If increasingly effective interdiction raises the amount seized, and demand is inelastic with
respect to the import level price, total exports (which include both seizures and the amount
consumed) will rise. With an upward sloping supply curve in the export sector, this will raise the
export price. This effect has been examined in Henry, Appendix A: The Effects of Interdiction on Drug
Exports, in SEALING THE BORDERS: THE EFFECTS OF MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN DRUG INTERDICTION,
supra note 11, at 133.
30. Marijuana consumption was estimated to be 4,700 metric tons in 1985. NNICC REPORT,
supra note 7, at 6. For the same year, an estimated 6,400 to 8,300 metric tons were "available for
use." Id. at 15.
31. In a seminar sponsored by the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control held on
May 8, 1987, Ann B. Wrobleski, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters,
estimated that U.S. cocaine consumption accounts for approximately 30% of world leaf production.
CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, 100TH CONG., iST SESS., COMBATING INTERNATIONAL DRUG CARTELS:
ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY 25-26 (Comm. Print 1987).
32. The very fact that the export and import prices of cocaine are so low relative to the final
price points, see infra, p. 243, adds to the implausibility of the assertion that there is market power at
these levels of the market. Final demand for cocaine is believed to be inelastic with respect to the
retail price; the derived demand curve faced by importers and exporters is certainly inelastic at the
current price. A cartel, if it in fact existed, would set a price high enough so that its demand curve
would be elastic at that price.
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(2) The availability of cocaine may become less predictable, deterring drug users from
habitual use. This effect can best be understood through a rather artificial
example. Assume that there are only a small number of marijuana users in
some isolated town, who are serviced by only one retailer and have no other
way of obtaining the drug.33 The dealer will sell them only one ounce at a
time. Their wholesaler, after years of faithful service, takes up heroin use and
becomes unreliable. As a result, there is now a one in three chance that the
drug will not be available when sought by the users. This makes marijuana
consumption less attractive than other recreational habits, so some users drop
out. In addition, those who remain are less generous and initiate fewer new
users. Even though the price of marijuana may not have risen, usage (both
incidence and prevalence) may decline.
The critical element of this tale is that the market is small and inventory
flexibility is limited. Neither condition is very plausible, however, for the
national market in cocaine. There seem to be a large number of importers,
wholesalers, 34 and users, 35 all of whom hold considerable inventories. Faced
with increased uncertainty, each group might respond by enlarging
inventories. This would increase the costs to both sellers and users (since
more money is tied up in inventory holdings), but given the cost of capital
relative to other costs, an additional month's inventory can have substantial
effect only if it adds significantly to the probability of loss.
It is possible that individual importers do not operate in a national market,
but sell to wholesalers only in one or two cities. If those wholesalers do not
have connections with other importers, then the loss of a single large
shipment might lead to temporary shortages in the metropolitan areas
serviced by that importer. Discussions with a number of high level dealers
and importers suggest that there is a great deal of selling across metropolitan
markets. 36 For example, a San Francisco cocaine importer reported having
regular customers as far away as Pittsburgh. 37 Absent information to the
contrary, one may assume that there is a national market at the import level,
and this feature points to the improbability of interdiction efforts decreasing
availability and use.
(3) Interdiction might also increase the risks incurred after importation. This
could happen in either or both of two ways. First, interdiction activities might
generate evidence to be used in prosecuting dealers with post-importation
involvement in the distribution chain. Second, interruptions to the smooth
33. That is, it would be very expensive and very risky for any user in this town to go to another
town and find another dealer.
34. The author has interviewed approximately 20 drug dealers, whose careers involved
primarily wholesale transactions. These dealers report holding modest inventories. Interviews with
various drug dealers [hereinafter Dealer Interviews].
35. Cocaine users typically buy quantities large enough for ten or more consumption sessions.
They economize on transaction costs this way. Heroin users, because of their poverty and lack of
self-control, rarely buy more than one day's consumption at a single transaction.
36. See Dealer Interviews, supra note 34.
37. Id.
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flow of imports might lead domestic dealers to engage in risky search
behavior (such as stealing from other dealers), thereby increasing their
exposure to enforcement.
Discussions with interdiction and investigative agencies suggests that the
first of these effects is quite implausible.3 8 In fact, the reverse is more likely to
be true, for domestic enforcement occasionally leads to interdiction activities,
though even this is relatively rare.3 9 Generally there is little exchange of
information among agencies, a matter of almost ritual complaint by
Congress. 40 Interdiction agencies have little to gain from generating
information for domestic cases and rarely capture the principals who could
provide such information. 4 1
The second effect is dealt with less easily. Available data do not permit
analysis of the impact of interdiction seizures on the search behavior of
domestic dealers. One can only be impressed, however, by the scale of the
relevant markets, the number of persons involved in high level transactions,
and the apparent breadth of the high level markets. 42 Unless the seizure rate
were sharply elevated for a sustained period of time, it is unlikely that
domestic dealers would engage in significantly more aggressive search
behavior.
There may be other effects, and it may be that some of the above is
argumentative and speculative, leaving open the possibility that there are
significant interdiction effects not captured in the import price. It seems,
however, more likely that the import price captures the truly significant effects
of interdiction on the drug trade, and this article proceeds on that
assumption.
An increase in the landed price of cocaine affects consumption of the drug
by raising the retail price. Under reasonable assumptions about the structure
of the markets at different levels from import to retail, one would expect that
a one dollar increase in landed price would raise the retail price by more than
one dollar. The differences reflect two factors: (1) the increased costs of
holding more expensive inventory; and (2) the increased risk of loss because
there is, with more expensive inventory, a higher incidence of theft by other
participants.
38. These facts were reported in interviews which the author conducted with DEA and Customs
personnel [hereinafter DEA and Customs Personnel Interviews].
39. Id.
40. Vocalization of such complaints can be found in a variety of hearings and floor debates. See,
e.g., Initiatives in Drug Interdiction, Hearings before the House Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985).
41. See Moore, Reorganization Plan #2 Reviewed: Problems in Implementing a Strategy to Reduce the
Supply of Drugs to Illicit Markets in the United States, 26 PuB. POL'Y 229 (1978).
42. A number of high level cocaine and marijuana dealers were asked about how they adapted to
a failure of sources to deliver. Most reported that they had alternative sources in the rare event that
this would occur. For example, a Seattle dealer who purchased one kilogram of cocaine each week
would borrow smaller amounts from another dealer, connected to a different source, when he ran
short. He offered a reciprocal service to the other dealer to cover the latter's shortages. See Dealer
Interviews, supra note 34.
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The first of these cost factors is a function of the cost of capital for dealers
and of the length of time they hold inventory. Using reasonably generous
assumptions, Mark Kleiman and I persuaded ourselves that this could not lead
to a mark-up of more than $1.50 at retail for each increase of $1.00 at the
import level. The increased risk caused by larger inventories, however, has
less straightforward consequences. Expensive illicit drugs provide great
inducement for participants to steal from each other, frequently by means of
violent force. The mere threat of theft by other participants accounts for a
large share of the domestic value added as drugs move along the distribution
chain. 43 Thus, a rise in the import and wholesale price of cocaine increases
the risks faced by domestic dealers; it is arguable, however, that the risk
compensation which dealers will require rises less than linearly with increases
in the value of their inventory.
Assuming the above to be true, a 10 percent increase in the landed price of
cocaine, from $30,000 to $33,000, is likely to increase the retail price by less
than $6,000, or 2 percent. Even if the demand for cocaine is assumed to be
quite elastic with respect to the retail price, demand remains very inelastic
with respect to the import price. For instance, assume that the elasticity of
demand for cocaine is three (that is, a 1 percent increase in the retail price
leads to a 3 percent decline in total consumption). Under the assumption, a
10 percent increase in the import price will lead to only a 6 percent decline in
consumption, exhibiting an elasticity of 0.6.
Intuition might suggest that a 10 percent increase in the import price will
raise the retail price by 10 percent. If domestic dealers follow a fixed
percentage mark-up policy for pricing, then this would indeed be the result.
In fact, the uncomfortable truth is that the recent declines in the retail price of
cocaine have been almost proportional to those at the import level.
44
Nonetheless, it seems highly unlikely that constant percentage mark-up
pricing could characterize competitive markets, since suppliers who followed
such a policy would find themselves vulnerable to undercutting by other
dealers whose prices reflected more accurately the risks and other costs
incurred.
If these observations are accurate, then the current interdiction program
has had relatively little effect on consumption of cocaine. The imported price
of cocaine in 1987 averaged about $30,000 per pure kilogram compared to a
retail price of about $250,000 (sold in one gram units at 30 percent purity).4 5
If the argument that most of the interdiction effect is captured in the
difference between export and import prices is extended, the export price
being determined primarily by production costs and the source country
control efforts, then the conclusion is even gloomier. Interdiction may
account for only about 8 percent of the total price of cocaine.
43. Id..
44. Discussions with DEA officials, supra note 13.
45. This is based on an estimated retail price of $75 per gram of 30% pure cocaine. Id.
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DRUG INTERDICTION
Interdiction has been the largest component of the federal drug effort for
many years. 46 Table 147 provides estimates of the expenditures for various
TABLE 1
FEDERAL DRUG ABUSE BUDGET OUTLAYS
FY84 TO FY86
Millions of Dollars
(percent of total)
Interdiction
Other Enforcement
Health Related
FY84 FY85 FY86
579.5 636.7 649.0
(38) (38) (38)
712.8 779.4 797.8
(47) (46) (46)
222.9 267.2 279.1
(15) (16) (16)
TOTAL 1515.2 1683.3 1725.9
components of the federal drug program over the last five years. In Fiscal
Year 1986, interdiction accounted for 38 percent of the total.
Two agencies, the Coast Guard (high seas interdiction) and the Customs
Service (air and coastal marine interdiction), administer the bulk of the
program. Other agencies, notably the military services, provide specialized
support, such as intelligence collation and airborne radar equipment. 48
The most frequently cited measure of the program's value is the amount of
drugs seized. The quantities for cocaine have risen most impressively in the
last five years.49 The amount of imported cocaine has also risen very
sharply. 50 Even compared to the rising consumption of the drug, however,
cocaine interdiction seems to be of increasing stringency, as measured by the
percentage of imported cocaine seized. 5'
In analyzing how increased interdiction might reduce cocaine
consumption in the United States, a summary of the results of the Simulation
46. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 185-88.
47. Table I is compiled using data appearing in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME,
AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG ABUSE, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME, app. D (1986).
48. Id. at 317.
49. See Table 2. Table 2 is compiled using data appearing in P. REUTER, G. CRAWFORD &J. CAVE,
SEALING THE BORDERS: EFFECTS OF INCREASED MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN DRUG INTERDICTION SUpra
note 11, at 73-74, 76 (1988).
50. The average of the high and low cocaine exports to the United States based on production
estimates were estimated to be 53 metric tons in 1981 and 132 tons in 1986. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, THE BORDER WAR ON DRUGS 11 (Mar. 1987).
51. By applying simple division to the seizure and import figures in the previous two footnotes,
3% (1.7/54.7) of the cocaine that individuals attempted to import into the United States in 1981 was
seized. In 1986, that figure was 17% (27.2/159.2).
[Vol. 5 1: No. I
Page 233: Winter 1988]
TABLE 2
ESTIMATES OF COCAINE IMPORTS TO U.S. AND COCAINE SEIZURES
1981-1985
(Metric Tons)
IMPORTS 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Min. Estimate 38 50 75 110 111
Max. Estimate 68 75 97 178 153
SEIZURES 1.7 5.1 8.9 13.4 25.0
SEIZURES/IMPORTS
Max. Estimate 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.23
Min. Estimated 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.16
of Adaptive Response (SOAR) model proves helpful.52  The model
incorporates the effects of adaptation by smugglers to changes in interdiction
strategies. Smuggler adaptation is one of the most striking features of the
interdiction experience and one that helps explain its disappointing
performance.
Three instances of large scale adaptation can be cited. First, increased
maritime interdiction of marijuana starting in the late 1970's led to a scaling
down of the size of individual shipments. The average Coast Guard seizure
fell from ten metric tons in fiscal year 1978 to five metric tons in fiscal year
1986. 5 3 This adaptation lowered the average risk per kilogram shipped and
reduced the probability of seizure of any individual shipment. This latter
effect is the consequence of an increase in the number of interdiction targets
for a given volume of exported marijuana, as well as the fact that it costs as
much to interdict a six ton shipment as it does to interdict an eleven ton
shipment.
A second instance of adaptation is the use by cocaine smugglers of Mexico
as a trans-shipment point in response to increased air interdiction. 54 Because
many small airfields are located within fifty miles of the U.S. border, air
smuggling over that border is attended by very low risk. 55
A third, and more speculative, adaptation to the increased severity of air
interdiction has been a shift to marine transportation, as evidenced by a sharp
increase in Coast Guard cocaine seizures. 56 Cocaine has a high ratio of dollar
value to mass and can be secreted in compartments on vessels that are much
less readily discovered by boarding personnel whose primary target is
52. See Figure 1, appearing in this text at p. 246. For a complete description of the model and its
mechanics, see G. CRAWFORD & P. REUTER, SIMULATION OF ADAPTIVE RESPONSE: A MODEL OF DRUG
INTERDICTION 63 (1988).
53. See generally U.S. COAST GUARD, GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERDICTION STATISTICS
(1986) [hereinafter COAST GUARD STATISTICS].
54. NNICC REPORT, supra note 7, at 32.
55. The shift to Mexico was also motivated by the increasing price, in Colombia, of certain
chemicals used in the refining of cocaine from coca paste.
56. Cocaine seizures by the U.S. Coast Guard have risen from 40 pounds in 1981 to 2,509
pounds in 1986. COAST GUARD STATISTICS, supra note 53, at 4.
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marijuana. Thus cocaine smuggled by sea may be much less vulnerable than
marijuana smuggled in the same manner.
The SOAR model assumes that the cocaine smuggler has a choice of
eleven routes (five sea, five air, and one land) by which to import the drug.
The routes differ in their attendant risks and costs; some have high transport
costs, and some have high personnel costs. Smugglers allocate shipments
among the routes so as to minimize the total expected shipment cost.
Initially, the model assumed that, on ten of the eleven routes, there was a
0.20 probability of a shipment being seized. The eleventh route represented
a Mexican land route, by which an individual courier carries the drug across
the U.S. border on his person. The interdiction probability on this route is
only 0.10. Not all of the drug was channeled through this route, however,
because use of this route involves high payroll costs.
Next, the impact of raising the interdiction rate to 0.50 on an increasing
number of routes was considered. For a small number of routes these
increases had little impact on the quantity consumed. Smugglers adapted and
shifted away from the high risk routes (those with an interdiction risk of 0.50)
to the other routes. The share of the drug moving through the low risk land
route rose quite slowly. Only when as many as five routes became high risk
was much impact felt upon total consumption, which fell by 15 percent at this
point. Further, the share shipped by way of the expensive land route doubled
to 19 percent.
Cocaine seizures rose dramatically, however, from 31.4 tons in the base
case to 58.3 tons. Even as a share of total shipment, seizures rose from 18
percent in the base case to 23 percent. Smugglers' costs rose much less
sharply.
In the final run ten routes faced a risk of 0.50; the expensive land route
risk remained constant at 0.10. This run produced a major decline in
consumption, which fell from 127.5 tons to 97.5 tons. Seizures rose even
more dramatically, rising from 32.5 tons to 78.2 tons. It is very questionable,
however, whether it is possible to raise interdiction rates on all air and sea
routes simultaneously to such a level.
One of the features that SOAR focuses on is the importance of the
composition of smuggler costs. As that composition changes, so does the
optimal choice of routes, which in turn can affect seizure rates. The rise in
actual seizures over the last five years may be accounted for simply by changes
in the replacement cost of cocaine, relative to other components of smuggler
costs. The fragments of data available on the export price of cocaine indicate
that, in nominal dollars, the price fell by 23 percent between the years 1983
and 1986. 57 This decrease probably reflects the export-led growth in the
production sector. Both U.S. and European demand have risen substantially
57. The average wholesale price of a kilogram of cocaine in Columbia fell from $9,200/kg. in
1983 to $7,500/kg. in 1986. Discussions with DEA officials, supra note 13.
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FIGURE 1
RESULTS OF THE SOAR MODEL:
QUANTITY LANDED BY QUANTITY SEIZED
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since the late 1970's. 58  With new production areas coming on line
gradually, 59 the supply curve has probably shifted out substantially.
The lower replacement cost for seized cocaine may induce traffickers to
invest less in the protection of shipments. Smugglers have a variety of
methods for bringing in cocaine, including private aircraft, air cargo, and
trucks across the Mexican border. With lower cocaine replacement costs,
smugglers may simply choose techniques which are more vulnerable but less
expensive. Consider, for example, that the average size of cocaine seizures
has risen dramatically; whereas 1980 apparently saw the first 100 kilogram
seizure, by 1986 the average seizure by the Customs Air Branch was 250
kilograms .60
58. There are no systematic estimates of cocaine consumption in any Western European
countries. However, indirect indicators (for example, size and number of seizures) point to an
increase in usage. See, e.g., Wille, Drug Addiction in the Federal Republic of Germany: Problems and
Responses, 82 BRITISHJ. ADDICTION 849, 849-50 (1987). For figures on usage in the United States, see
NNICC REPORT, supra note 7, at 26.
59. Given that it takes two to four years for a coca bush to reach maturity and produce its
maximum yield, many of these new fields are just beginning to come on line. EVEREST CONSULTING
ASSOCIATES, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PRODUCTION, TRAFFICKING AND
MARKETING OF COCA AND COCAINE 39 (1983).
60. NNICC REPORT, supra note 7, at 42.
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The other reason for the disappointing impact of interdiction is that the
personnel costs of importation are low, while the value of shipments tends to
be high. Coast Guard marijuana seizures weighed, on the average, five metric
tons in 1985, with crew size averaging four persons. 6' Even if crewmen
demanded $100,000 per trip (a figure that observers believe far higher than
the actual payments) in order to incur the high risks of being captured and
imprisoned, total personnel costs for the trip would be only $120 per
kilogram, compared to a final selling price of approximately $2,000 per kilo.
The fact that these individuals are associated with such large quantities when
caught points to the inefficacy of their capture as a deterrent, as opposed to an
incapacitative, strategy.
This analysis of the allocation of responsibility among levels of
government suggests that there is a systematic bias in favor of enforcement
against the upper levels of the drug trade. This bias may be severely
misplaced.
IV
QUANTITY ILLUSIONS AND POLICY
Economists have always had great contempt for "money illusion," the
notion that wage earners in an era of inflation fail to take account of the fact
that their higher nominal wages have no greater purchasing power than
before. Notwithstanding that contempt, money illusion does have some
empirical basis.62 In discussions of drug enforcement, there exists a parallel
concept of "quantity illusion," a belief that the quantity of drugs seized is a
useful means of measuring the efficacy of enforcement efforts. In this case,
the source of the problem is the lack of reference to price. The result of this
illusion is an overemphasis on the value of enforcement efforts in the early
stages of the distribution system.
An illegal drug's price increases as it moves away from the source of
production. It costs only about $5,000 to replace a kilogram of cocaine seized
in Bolivia, at the point where it is about to be sent to Colombia for shipment
to the United States. By the time that same kilogram is available for sale in
Chicago, its replacement cost has risen to almost $45,000.63 It is as easy (or
difficult) to replace ten kilograms in Bolivia as to replace one kilogram in
Detroit.
There is no mystery to this conundrum. As the drug moves through the
distribution system, production cost quickly becomes a trivial component of
the total value of the drug. For cocaine and marijuana, the cost of actual
61. COAST GUARD STATISTICS, supra note 53.
62. Keynes wrote, "It is sometimes said that it would be illogical for labour to resist a reduction
of money-wages but not to resist a reduction of real wages. For reasons given below, this might not
be so illogical as it appears at first; and . . . fortunately so. But, whether logical or illogical,
experience shows that this is how labour in fact behaves." J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 9 (1936).
63. High price for 1985. Office of Intelligence, Illicit Drug Wholesale and Retail Prices 4
(December 1987) (unpublished data).
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production, even including all the money required to compensate the farmer
for incurring risks of eradication and other kinds of enforcement activity, is
only about 1 percent of the retail price. 64 While drug production is cheap, its
distribution is risky and expensive. Seizing vast quantities of drugs before the
enormous costs of distribution have been incurred inflicts little injury on the
drug trade. 6 5
The relatively low cost of producing drugs is easily explained. First, the
factors of production, predominantly land and labor in the source countries,
have a very low opportunity cost compared to their U.S. counterparts. 66 Little
specialization of either of these factors is required and the time for crop
maturation is measured in months rather than years. 67 The supply curve is
likely to be quite elastic, even in the short run. Second, source governments
create relatively modest risks for growers, in large part due to the political
costs associated with depriving a politically powerful group of an important
source of cash income.68 The two factors are clearly related.
The quantity emphasis is dangerous because it promotes continued
reliance upon a system of enforcement which focuses on production capacity,
the one factor which is readily available in the drug market. Replacement cost
would provide a more appropriate measure of the impact of drug seizures,
since it takes into account the truly scarce resource of efficient distribution.
The emphasis on quantity is reflected in the increasing attention given
interdiction programs. These programs generate the visible seizures and
thus, at a time of increased federal concern about drug enforcement, are able
to attract a growing share of the budget. One finds occasional reference to
seizure rates rather than absolute quantities, but the author has found no
reference to the effect that the programs might have on the price of the drugs
when landed.
The emphasis on quantity also provides support for increased federal
involvement in enforcement. Because federal agencies can seize drugs
outside the country, they can produce larger seizures than can equivalent
commitments by local agencies. The latter act against the lower end of the
64. Based on information provided by DEA Intelligence, the amount paid at the "farmgate" for
enough coca leaves to produce one pure kilogram of cocaine is about $1,200. This $1,200 can be
compared to the approximately $250,000 paid for the same pure kilogram of cocaine after it has
worked its way through the distribution chain to the street level. Id.
65. The point is illustrated by means of a military analogy. In considering the allocation of
resources among various sections of the battlefront, a military strategist must take into account the
replacement cost of enemy assets to be removed by those resources. A tank destroyed at the enemy's
rear, close to the factory, can be replaced to that point for little more than the manufacturing cost.
The same tank destroyed just before it has reached the front has a much higher replacement cost,
since another tank must be brought through all the same risks that the lost tank had survived. Thus,
the valuation of tank destruction capacities is dependent upon where the destruction is likely to
occur.
66. Much of the land used for cocaine production, particularly in newer growing areas such as
the Chappare in Bolivia, is reputed to be uneconomic for any other crop. See EVEREST CONSULTING
ASSOCIATES, supra note 59, at 66.
67. Id. at 39.
68. See, e.g., Brinkley, Bolivia Drug Crackdown Brews Trouble, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1984, at AI, col.
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distribution system, in which drugs are held in smaller but more expensive
(and thus less easily replaceable) quantities. As long as quantity is perceived
to be the measure of drug enforcement success, however, local governmental
units will be perceived as less effective.
The quantity illusion also contributes to the manner in which particular
dealers become targets. It is assumed that removing a dealer capable of
handling large quantities is preferable, from society's point of view, to
removing a dealer lower down in the system. Certainly the formal scoring
systems used in the drug enforcement community, which rate individuals
according to the unit shipments with which they deal, reflect this belief.69
Since federal agencies have both the legal and investigative resources to
target higher level dealers, it is assumed that federal agents have optimum
impact in controlling drug use.
This argument is at best incomplete and possibly misleading. The proper
measure of the importance of a dealer is his contribution to the value added in
the system. In other words, the higher his value added, the greater is the risk
that the system must incur in order to replace him if he is incarcerated. Thus,
if a dealer purchases large quantities and sells them intact, he absorbs little
distribution risk and adds little value to the system. For example, a dealer
may buy (monthly) in ten kilogram units at $30,000 and sell in five kilogram
units at $32,000. In terms of the flow of drugs, he appears to be a big dealer.
In terms of total value added, however, he contributes only $20,000 per
month. This may be far less than the income generated by a dealer who each
month purchases a one kilogram unit at $40,000 but sells individual ounces 70
at $2,000 per ounce. The latter's value added is $30,000 per month.
These are not artificial examples. The drug distribution system is
characterized by widely varying degrees of commitment and a great deal of
opportunism. An unaggressive dealer who knows a good ten kilogram source
and two good five kilogram customers may well occupy the niche described in
the previous paragraph. An aggressive low level wholesaler may make a large
number of transactions.
On the average, it is probably true that larger dealers make a greater
contribution to value added than do smaller dealers. Yet averages can be very
misleading; the dealer populations at each level are likely to be quite
heterogeneous. Moreover, one must also consider the efficacy of
enforcement resources on a unit basis. Higher level dealers are likely to be
more expensive to investigate than are their lower level counterparts;
certainly they are more expensive to prosecute. They perform fewer
transactions per unit of time than do dealers lower down in the system, and
their exposure (which is a function of the frequency of transactions) is
69. See M. Kleiman, Allocating Federal Drug Enforcement Resources: The Case of Marijuana
76-77 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univ.
1985).
70. The reader who carps at my mixing of metric and British units of measures is unfamiliar with
the drug distribution system, which mixes the two quite liberally.
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proportionally lower. If higher level dealers also generate greater value
added, almost all of it is net income to them individually and they can
therefore be expected to invest more in protecting each transaction from
effective investigation.
While enforcement risk does not explain all of the value added in cocaine
distribution, and the marginal and average product may be very different, it is
nonetheless possible to make a crude calculation of the relative effectiveness
of federal cocaine enforcement resources as compared to those of state and
local agencies. This calculation requires measuring the dollars of value added
which a given type of enforcement activity can remove from the drug
distribution system against the dollars of investigative and prosecutorial
resources required to so remove. Such a calculation produces a more refined
measure of the allocation of criminal justice resources.
For the federal government, the total cocaine enforcement effort is
roughly $500 million. 7' This accounts for less than $50,000 of the retail price
of cocaine (about one-sixth), assuming that those resources are (as claimed in
the official Drug Enforcement Agency reports) 72 concentrated almost entirely
on individuals involved in operations that handle units of at least one
kilogram. It is difficult to estimate and break down by specific drug the
resource commitment of state and local agencies. Total state and local law
enforcement expenditures are over $35 billion annually, and cocaine arrests
comprise approximately 120,000 of 12 million total arrests;73 a figure of $1
billion for state and local cocaine enforcement appears generous. Since the
price of cocaine rises from $50,000 per kilogram to about $300,000 as it
moves from the kilogram level to retail sale,74 this appears to be a more
effective expenditure than that of the federal agencies.
V
CONCLUSION
The conclusion has to be severely qualified. The price of cocaine would
rise even without enforcement; distribution is never costless. The marginal
product of state and local expenditures, moreover, may be very different from
71. Total federal drug enforcement expenditures for the financial year 1986 were approximately
$1.4 billion, see Table 1 supra, p. 244. This was allocated among drugs in accordance with judgments
made about how each of the principal enforcement agencies allocates its efforts among marijuana,
cocaine, heroin, and "dangerous drugs" (synthetics). For example, 80% of Coast Guard
expenditures was allocated to marijuana enforcement and only 20% to cocaine enforcement,
reflecting approximately the values of seizures of the two drugs generated by the agency. The $500
million is clearly a very rough approximation.
72. For example, in 1986, DEA asserted that in fiscal year 1985, 2.1 million of its 3.1 million
special agent investigative work hours went to investigation of Class I cases, that is, those involving
the highest level dealers. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. JUSTICE DEP'T ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT OF FY 1985, supra note 2, at 47.
73. The FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting System does not distinguish between arrests for heroin
and cocaine. This author's estimate for cocaine arrests is simply 50% of the figure for heroin and
cocaine.
74. These figures are based on an estimated retail price of $75 per gram of 30% pure cocaine.
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the average expenditures. Similarly, the lower level distribution system may
have sources of risk unrelated to enforcement that account for a significant
share of the price increase. As the nation moves to a federally driven drug
enforcement system, however, it is necessary to consider more closely
whether the results justify such a large scale usurpation of traditional state
responsibilities.
